Critics have argued that behaviorism must necessarily be inadequate to account for complex human behavior whereas cognitive psychology is adequate to account for such behavior. Recently, Fodor has focused this criticism on certain situations in which humans choose among a set of alternatives. We argue that this criticism applies to forms of behaviorism that are reductionistic but not to non-reductionistic behaviorisms like that of Skinner. Non-reductionistic behaviorism can be used to interpret human choice situations of varying degrees of complexity. Such (...) interpretations run into difficulty in accounting for certain aspects of verbal behavior, but so do cognitive theories. Although nothing, in principle, prohibits either type of theory from accounting for complex human behavior, neither current behavioral theory nor current cognitive theory is developed enough at the present time to do so. (shrink)

After precisely specifying the thesis of the causal theory of time, Grünbaum's program developed to support this thesis is examined. Four objections to his definition of temporal order in terms of a more primitive causal relation are put and held to be conclusive. Finally, the philosophical arguments that Grünbaum has proposed supporting the desirability of establishing a causal theory of time are shown to be either invalid or inconclusive.

Their initial assumption, however, is mistaken. Augustine's worries were not linguistic ones, although to be fair to the recent critics his worries were exacerbated by some linguistic muddles. He knew perfectly well that he had no trouble talking about time. This he accepted as a fact. His problem was that, although he used temporal terms correctly very easily, he did not know to what they referred. He wanted to know whether time is a feature of the objective physical world, or (...) whether time is a subjective phenomenon; whether temporal relations are relations among physical events, or relations among private, mental events. Ordinary usage did not supply answers to these questions. Indeed, correct ordinary usage is compatible with temporal terms sometimes referring to features of the physical world, sometimes to subjective phenomena. He also wanted to know whether temporal discourse requires reference to specifically temporal entities, i.e., entities or moments which exist independently of things, or whether time is adequately accounted for in terms of the temporal relations among events; whether the measurement of time depends upon the measurement of specifically temporal objects, or whether it is accounted for in terms of features of physical processes. In the course of his inquiry Augustine repeatedly expressed bewilderment. This bewilderment is due not to his being unable to find other words to do the job of "time," but to the fact that the answers do not readily emerge from ordinary ways of talking about "time.". (shrink)

A reasonable choice between Skinner's and Chomsky's theories requires reference to a conception of human nature. It is explained in detail why this is so, in the context of an analysis of what it is to ‘choose’ a theory. This account helps to explain the unity and coherence of the science, methodology, conception of science, object of scientific inquiry and views towards control of each of Skinner and Chomsky, and thereby explains the chasm which separates the parties to their respective (...) programs. The analysis given implies that, in a precise sense, the theory-choice is implicated in value-judgments. (shrink)

Most relational theories assert both that spatial discourse is reducible to talk about physical objects and their spatial relations, and that the relation of congruence derives from a non-metrical relation which intervals bear or possibly bear to measuring instruments. We have shown that there are serious logical difficulties involved in maintaining both these positions and the thesis of the continuity of space. We have also shown that Grünbaum's motivating argument for the reduction of congruence is unsound, and, moreover, that the (...) prospects of formulating the kind of definition which this reduction requires seem to rest upon a wholly vague notion of physical possibility. Alternatively, if congruence is taken as primitive, it seems plausible that spatial discourse can be reconstructed so that there is no ontological commitment to spatial objects other than physical objects. Whether or not this relational thesis is ultimately defensible requires more elaboration of the relational theory, and investigation of its role in the formalizations of current physical theories. It is odd, considering the wide currency of relational theories, that this work has never been done. (shrink)